2. Violence and Democracy
In February 2002, the nation was shocked anew by the nexus between violence and democracy: 15-year-old Mahima was raped by boys of the student fronts of the ruling coalition because her brother and father were supporters of the opposition. They took pictures of the rape and distributed them throughout the village: she committed suicide.1 But what's new about rape?
In September 1998, a committee investigated allegations of sexual abuse at Jahangirnagar University against boys from the Bangladesh Chatra League (BCL), the student front of the ruling party at the time, the Awami League. It revealed that
more than 20 female students were raped and over 300 others were sexually harassed on the campus by the "armed cadres of a particular political party."2
What's new about rape?
This was the question raised by Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes in the Lok Sabha on April 30, 2002 a propos the Gujarat pogrom. According to Frontline:
In less than 12 months, Gujarat's Hindu Right will face Assembly elections. Discredited by its record on the economic front, and its less-than-creditable handling of the 2001 Kutch earthquake, few people had given the Bharatiya Janata Party a serious chance to retain power. Now, after February 28, the Hindu Right is again on a roll. It has learned the lessons of the 1998 Lok Sabha elections when a string of attacks on Christians and Muslims in south Gujarat helped the BJP wrest key seats, including Godhra, from the Congress(I)....3
Mr. Fernandes was referring to an earlier pogrom that involving Sikhs after two members of the community murdered Indira Gandhi. According to Harvard anthropologist Stanley J. Tambiah, author of Leveling Crowds: Ethnonationalist Conflicts and Collective Violence in South Asia: "Even when the suddenness and the emotional trauma of Indira Gandhi's assassination are taken into account, the evidence is clear that...the destructive actions of the mob...were encouraged, directed, and even provisioned by Congress (I) politicians, activists and supporters, and indirectly aided by an inactive, cooperative police force."4
There is a striking similarity between the anti-Muslim riots of 2002, the anti-Sikh riots of 1984 in India and the anti-Tamil riots of 1983 in Sri Lanka. Tambiah observes: '...participatory democracy, competitive elections, mass militancy, and crowd violence are not disconnected.5 " He adds: "They were not disconnected in Europe: in Britain, for instance, the latter part of the nineteenth century saw the parallel rise of democracy and industrial militancy....And before that the French Revolution had ushered in the crowd as an enduring political force...."6 But more on the French Revolution below.
A glance at the experiences of Latin American countries 'before' and 'after' democracy reveals an explosive growth in murder rates under democratic governments.7
| Country | Murder rates per 100,000 population | Years | Government | |
| Late 70s early 80s | Late 80s - early 90s | |||
| Brazil | 11.5 | 19.7 | 19641985 | Military rule |
| Mexico | 18.2 | 17.8 | 1929-2000 | Monopoly of power of Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 2.1 | 12.6 | 1956-1986 | 30-year rule of the People's National Movement |
| Peru | 2.4 | 11.5 | 1968-1980 | Military rule |
| Panama | 2.1 | 10.9 | 1968-1978 | Virtual dictatorship of Torrijos |
| Ecuador | 6.4 | 10.3 | 1945-1979 | Military rule |
| Argentina | 3.9 | 4.8 | 1976-1983 | Rule by military junta |
| Uruguay | 2.6 | 4.4 | 1973-1985 | Military rule |
| Paraguay | 5.1 | 4 | 1955-1990 | Alfredo Stroessner (president for 35 years) overthrown in coup by Gen. Rodriguez, later elected on 1st May |
| Chile | 2.6 | 3 | 1973-1989 | General Pinochet rules |
| Colombia | 20.5 | 89.5 | 1957-1974 | National Front's monopoly; voter apathy threatens military involvement; voters confident in 1982 ditto drug-traffickers |
| Venezuela | 11.7 | 15.2 | 1969-1999 | Two-party democracy: oil-bonanza creates privileged elite glut stagnates economy till late 1980s; austerity leads to violence : constitutional rights suspended as armed forces restore order in 1990 |
That democracy and violence had always been connected in people's minds until very recently is testified by the obsession of The Federalist Papers with questions of safety:
"Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage were all republics; two of them, Athens and Carthage, of the commercial kind. Yet were they ... often engaged in wars...."
"Venice, in later times, figured more than once in wars of ambition..."
"The provinces of Holland, till they were overwhelmed in debts and taxes, took a leading and conspicuous part in the wars of Europe."
"In the government of Britain the representatives of the people compose one branch of the national legislature. Commerce has been for ages the predominant pursuit of that country. Few nations, nevertheless, have been more frequently engaged in war; and the wars in which that kingdom has been engaged have, in numerous instances, proceeded from the people."8
"It is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of Greece and Italy without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions with which they were continually agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolutions by which they were kept in a state of perpetual vibration between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy."9
As Tambiah has observed: "The general theme of whether democracy as a political process and the democratic state as a system intensify the occurrence of violence is an old one in the history of political theory. From the Greeks onwards, even up to the nineteenth century, many theorists, perhaps most, associated democracy with civil strife, and it is only subsequently that this became a minority view."10
Thus we have Plato's famous lines in The Republic:
'And those who have been of this little company and have tasted the sweetness and blessedness of this possession and who have also come to understand the madness of the multitude sufficiently and have seen that there is nothing, if I may say so, sound or right in any present politics, and that there is no ally with whose aid the champion of justice could escape destruction, but that he would be as a man who has fallen among wild beasts, unwilling to share their misdeeds and unable to hold out singly against the savagery of all, and that he would thus, before he could in any way benefit his friends or the state, come to an untimely end without doing any good to himself or others for all these reasons I say the philosopher remains quiet, minds his own affair, and, as it were, standing aside under shelter of a wall in a storm and blast of dust and sleet and seeing others filled full of lawlessness, is content if in any way he may keep himself free from iniquity and unholy deeds through his life and take his departure with fair hope, serene and well content when the end comes"'11
Compare Thucydides:
'Pericles, indeed, by his rank, ability and known integrity was enabled to exercise an independent control over the multitude in short, to lead them instead of being led by them;...what was nominally a democracy became in his hands government by the first citizen. With his successors it was different. More on a level with one another, and each grasping at supremacy, they ended by committing even the conduct of state affairs to the whims of the multitude.' 12
Given such events as the murder and enslavement of the Melians, the disastrous invasion of Sicily, the execution of Socrates and the fact that between 479 and 338 BC Athens was at war every two out of three years, with never more than ten consecutive years of peace, it is not surprising that the Thucydidean and Platonic criticisms of democracy should echo one another.
According to S.E. Finer: "The Forum polity is comparatively rare in the history of government, where the Palace polity and its variants are overwhelmingly the most common type. Only in the last two centuries has the Forum polity become widespread. Before then its appearance is, on the whole, limited to the Greek poleis, the Roman Republic, and the mediaeval European city-states. Furthermore, most of them for most of the time exhibited the worst pathological features of this kind of polity. For rhetoric read demagogy, for persuasion read corruption, pressure, intimidation, and falsification of the vote. For meetings and assemblies, read tumult and riot. For mature deliberation through a set of revising institutions, read instead self-division, inconstancy, slowness, and legislative and administrative stultification. And for elections read factional plots and intrigues. These features were the ones characteristically associated with the Forum polity in Europe down to very recent times. They were what gave the term 'Republic' a bad name, but made 'Democracy' an object of sheer horror."13
A pattern emerges from Malawi to the Philippines. In the latter country, the death penalty had been abolished in 1986. It was re-introduced in 1995, and enthusiastically backed by judges as well as the Roman Catholic population. The new death penalty covers rape, incest, drug trafficking and murder.14 Several sexual murders created the momentum for its popular re-introduction. In Malawi, donors forced the former dictator to call an election in 1994. Since then, mugging and violent crime has soared.15 The murder rate in South Africa was seven times that of the United States 61 per 100,000 in 1996.16 Russia has the highest murder rate in the world after South Africa.17 Since the successful conclusion of 'Operation Restore Democracy' in 1994 by America in Haiti, the Americans' main concern has been less about democracy than the collapse of government, and with it, rising crime, violence, and most relevantly for the Americans re-export of drugs from Haiti to the United States.18 The 25-year-rule of Lynden O. Pindling ended in the Bahamas, and his Progressive Liberal party became the opposition, in 1992;19 he was accused of involving students in politics. Crime has become an election issue and the Bahamas like the Philippines has started hanging people after a gap of 14 years. In Nepal, politics became criminalised, even as the police became politicised.20 The Maoist insurgency cost the lives of 11,000 people21 . In Kenya, the rich and entrepreneurial Asian minority began a South Africa-style exodus their age-old connection with the ruling party exposed them to threats from the opposition, while the government said it could do nothing to protect them from increasing gangster violence.22 Today's violence in Jamaica has its origins in the political conflicts of the 1970s, when both the Jamaica Labour Party and the ruling People's National Party used rival gun gangs that tore the nation apart.23 In Nigeria, ethnic and religious violence has escalated since the democratic transition. Since Nigeria returned to civilian rule in May 1999, more than 10,000 people have died in ethnic and religious violence fomented by vote-hungry politicians.24 In Taiwan, gangsters have penetrated parliament, and, as Lee Kuan Yew observed, Taiwan's elections have been condemned for the use of gangsters.25 The democracy of Israel was established at the expense of the Arab majority of Palestine the minority that remained after most Arabs became refugees were granted political rights, an act that permitted Israel to burnish its credential as a democracy, which, however, has not compensated for perceptions of illegitimacy. Since inception, the democracy has been the focus of violence throughout the Middle East.26 And, of course, the democratisation of Yugoslavia has unleashed some of the worst violence in recent memory.27 But it is in Central Africa that the death toll has been highest since the post-Cold-War transition to democracy. In June 1993, Melchior Ndadaye a Hutu won Burundi's first democratic election 'by virtue of being a member of the biggest tribe in a country where a free vote naturally meant a vote along ethnic lines',28 as The Economist observed. In October, 1993, Ndadaye was murdered by the Tutsi-dominated army. Over 250,000 people were killed in the subsequent massacre. General Habyarimana, since grabbing power in a bloodless coup, had run Rwanda for 21 years. Tutsi rebels who had fled to Uganda earlier invaded Rwanda as the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1990. Under the 1993 peace deal both sides agreed to form an integrated army and to share power in a new national government. Hard-liners shot down Habyarimana's plane on April 6th, 1994, and a well-planned pogrom ensued. 800,000 Tutsis were butchered. The RPF captured the country, and 2 million Hutus fled, mostly to Zaire. In Burundi, a Hutu-led coalition that had won power in the 1993 election was overthrown by a Tutsi-led coup in July 1996. Both Rwanda and Burundi, 80% Hutu, were now controlled by Tutsis. 'For Tutsis after 1994, "democracy means death"' observes David Reynolds in his book One World Divisible.29
The Tutsi-led government in Rwanda was afraid that the Hutus in Zaire (now Congo), sheltered by Mobutu Sese Seko, would rearm and return. Rwanda organised a rebellion and toppled Mobutu. They replaced him with Laurent Kabila, who turned against his backers and armed the Hutus. Rwanda tried, and failed, to topple him, despite help from Uganda and Burundi Angola and Zimbabwe, among five nations, came to Kabila's rescue. Nine national armies and their rebel proteges shot, hacked and starved over 3 million people to death in Congo. 30
Much of sub-Saharan Africa had been violent even before the democratic transition of 1989-92. However, what we perceive is a widening of the area of violence after the democratic transition. The reason for this will be apparent in the third section, when Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascol Daloz, two anthropologists, explain.
At the same time, in a democracy, highly efficient pressure groups can wield the entire apparatus of the state against an unrepresented people (the violence inherent in 'civil society' will be explored in the next section). The Israel and Cuban-American lobbies come readily to mind; so do the farm and steel lobbies, for instance. Blacks in the United States, however, have had to riot on many occasions to make their presence known to the majority. (The under-representation of African-Americans in the American political decision-making process is underscored by some stark statistics: though only 12% of the population, by 1990 blacks had come to represent over 44% of prison population - in 1994, 7% of all black men were behind bars, compared to less than 1% of white men. Since incarceration deprives one of the right to vote in the most populous states, and since prisoners are usually prevented from voting, African-Americans have been significantly disenfranchised.31 ) Blacks are not 'effectively' represented.
And neither are most foreign peoples. As James Zogby, president of the Arab-American Institute, observes: "When we do focus groups, Americans say, 'I know who the Israelis are, I don't know who Palestinians are.' And they sympathize and identify with the one they know."32 Hence, we come across such chilling passages as the following in The Economist:
'The last presidential election saw about 4m evangelical conservatives, once reliable Republican voters, staying at home. Mr Bush may be able to re-engage evangelicals by getting cloning banned. But this will count for nothing if they conclude that he is putting pragmatism above principle on Israel, a country evangelicals revere both as a home for God's chosen people and as the scene of the "end of days". The stakes are particularly high because the impending ban on soft money, which will kick in after the November elections unless it is ruled unconstitutional, will make the Republican Party far more dependent on the sort of small donations that come from grass-roots activists.
'The make-or-break issue for Mr. Bush, however, will be Iraq. Mr. Bush aroused huge expectations on the right when he promised to confront the "axis of evil" and extend the war against terrorism into a war against heavily armed toxic states. He has repeatedly stated his determination to mount a war against Saddam Hussein to damp down criticisms of his Middle East policy.'...33
And yet Japan is also a democracy with some of the world's lowest figures for crime and highest for crime detection. The difference between Japan and, say, India, is that Japan has 'bureaucratised' democracy: the Liberal Democratic Party has been in power for nearly 50 years, and it is the bureaucrats who run the country.
Japan has a conviction rate of 99.8% despite the fact that, in 1990, 31% of offenders were released after signing an apology. But these were for minor offences; for major offences, the Japanese police only strike when they're absolutely certain. Most convictions are obtained by means of unconstitutional confessions. On the other hand, non-offenders love the police! The emphasis is on crime-prevention with policemen spread out across the country in boxes to offer help (including personal loans!). In 1991, there were 188,000 requests for personal advice. A third related to crime-prevention, over a quarter to family problems, and around a fifth to other matters, like personal finance. The number of articles returned to the police (4.1m) exceeded the number reported lost (2.9m). 18.5 billion yen ($137 million) of lost cash were handed over by friendly citizens.34 The Japanese style of policing and Japanese political culture - explains why Japan has both one of the world's lowest rates of violent crime as well as one of the lowest rates of incarceration35, despite an economic downturn lasting well over a decade. In the next section, we shall see how the Japanese culture of hierarchic submission has encouraged harmony rather than confrontation.
| Incarceration rates (prisoners per 100,000 population), 2002 | |
| United States | 700 |
| Russia | 660 |
| Belarus | 550 |
| South Africa | 400 |
| Thailand | 340 |
| England and Wales | 132 |
| China | 108 (2000) |
| Canada | 102 |
| Italy | 97 (2000) |
| France | 85 |
| Japan | 48 (2001) |
After three wars two worldwide a Brussels-run Europe has certainly taken the bureaucratic way out of violence. As Larry Siedentop has observed: "The direct election of Euro MPs is itself hardly more than a fig-leaf which fails to conceal the over-sized member of the European body the power of the European Commission and a bureaucracy imperfectly controlled by the Council of Ministers".36 That the pathologies of democracy are fresh in the minds of the European elite has been glaringly obvious since the Austrian election that produced a government consisting of the Freedom Party. Louis Michel, the foreign minister of Belgium, said that voters can be "naive" and "simple". It is not enough, he maintains, to be democratically elected: Hitler's party was elected, too. Of Jorg Haider's Freedom Party, he says that to be a democratic party "you must work by democratic rules, you must accept not to play on the worst feelings each human being has inside himself."37
The European masses were rarely consulted, and only when the infrastructure of the European Union was firmly in place. One senior German diplomat has been quoted as saying: "If we had had a referendum on the Treaty of Rome, people might have rejected it on the grounds that it raised the price of bananas".38 And when they said "No" in a referendum, they were asked again and again. Very few Europeans today understand the leviathan: in the 1999 elections to the European Parliament, turnout fell below 50% for the first time, and had voting not been compulsory in Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and Belgium, turnout would probably have been 42%!39 In 2004, turnout was, in fact, 45%.40 An elite terrified of the prospect of another war conceived the entire project.
Larry Siedentop bemoans the loss of people power. We have already noted above Tambiah's observation: "...the French Revolution had ushered in the crowd as an enduring political force...." Unfortunately, considerably more than the crowd became an enduring political force. One has only to examine the legacies of the French Revolution to appreciate the dangers inherent in people power. Without the people's sovereignty, the people's army, the people's language and culture in short, the people the First and Second world wars would have been impossible: every force unleashed by the French revolution incubated into the world wars.
According to J. M. Roberts: "Europe had, after all, been prepared for war by the first age of mass education and literacy, by the first mass newspapers, and by decades of the propagation of ideals of patriotism. When it started, the Great War, which was to reveal itself as the most democratic in history in its nature, may well also have been the most popular ever."41 (Emphases added).
| Suffrage in Selected European Countries before 191442 | ||
| Austria | 1907 | Universal Male Suffrage |
| Belgium | 1894 | Universal Male Suffrage |
| France | 1870 | Universal Male Suffrage |
| Germany | 1870 | Universal Male Suffrage |
| Italy | 1912 | Universal Male Suffrage |
| Netherlands | 1894 | Universal Male Suffrage |
| Spain | 1900 | Universal Male Suffrage |
| Sweden | 1909 | Universal Male Suffrage |
| Switzerland | 1874 | Universal Male Suffrage |
| United Kingdom | 1884 | 4.38 million = 15% population |
For even the Social Democrats 'blood proved thicker than water',43 and they abandoned their socialism and pacifism to support their respective nations. This, despite the fact that the socialist vote was increasing; that socialist parties were becoming firmly entrenched in national parliaments: the Social Democratic Party had 1 million members, controlled 90 newspapers with a circulation of almost 1.5 million and attracted 4 million votes.44 Rather, this essay would argue, it was because of their increasing contact with voters that they had to respond to the war along nationalist lines. As we have seen, the French Revolution established and sacralised the citizen-soldier-voter link.
A legacy of the revolution was the combination of the two principles of the 'Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen': first, the nation decides its own destiny, and, second, 'the nation' means the People45 . The French nation was not to be a collection of individuals, but a union of persons into one family: worship of the collective self. As Finer observed "...the Revolution became a kind of religion, and one that everybody was supposed to share"46 . The Declaration 'consecrated the principle of election by or through the People'47 . The deification of the people had begun: the French people deified, the Germans soon reacted by deifying the German people. Finer quotes Heine as having anticipated Nazi Germany 100 years before the event: "There will come upon the scene armed Fichteans whose fanaticism of will is to be restrained neither by fear nor by self-interest; for they live in the spirit, they defy matter like those early Christians who could be subdued neither by bodily torments nor by bodily delights...he has allied himself with the primitive powers of nature, that he can conjure up the demoniac forces of old German pantheism....The old stone gods will arise from the forgotten ruins and wipe from their eyes the dust of centuries and Thor with his giant hammer will rise again, and he will shatter the Gothic cathedrals...48
| THE DEMOCRATIC DEATH TOLL: THE TWO WORLD WARS49 | |
| World War I | c. 8,400,000 |
| World War II | c. 55,000,000 |
| TOTAL | c. 63,400,000 |
"The mass religion of The Nation was reflected in equally mass defence".50 The citizen army was another legacy of the French Revolution. Compare the military strength of nations before 1789 and later:51
| 1740 | 1914 | ||
| Peacetime Army Numbers | Total Wartime Strength | ||
| Prussia | 80,000 | 750,000 (Germany) | 5,300,000 |
| France | 160,000 | 800,000 | 4,400,000 |
The qualitative change was no less striking: in 1914, the army consisted of nationals; not so in the eighteenth century. We, therefore, had huge numbers able to fight, and willing to kill and be killed. Where the American War had bankrupted France and led to revolution, now it was inexpensive to employ soldiers. "Every able-bodied man regarded this, now, as a sacred duty. That is how, when 1914 came, so many millions of men went to their graves like sheep."52 (italics added).
Bertrand Russell once wrote: "Belief in democracy, however, like any other belief, may be carried to the point where it becomes fanatical and therefore harmful" .53 And as Hugh Brogan observes: "But Western democracy, however perfect its forms (and nowhere are they entirely consistent with its principles) always has problems on its hands that may prove too much for it. It could not avert the outbreak of two world wars, and a third has been averted so far more through terror of nuclear weapons than by democratic wisdom. Class conflicts are muted rather than resolved. Nationalism still distorts voters' judgments in matters of foreign policy; greed misleads them over economic policy. Demagogues are as much a menace as they were in ancient Athens, and many politicians are personally corrupt". He concludes with these very important words: "If man, the political animal, is to save himself and his civilizations, he cannot yet rest from seeking new forms of government to meet the ever-new needs of his times."54 To be stuck in the worship of an ancient idol foredooms humanity to an early and unnecessary grave.
Notes:
1 The Bangladesh Observer, 7th March, 2002
2 The Daily Star, October 1st 1998, Online: http://www.dailystarnews.com/
3 Frontline, March 29th 2002, pp. 12-13
4 Stanley J. Tambiah ,Leveling Crowds: Ethnonationalist Conflicts and Collective Violence in South Asia, (New Delhi: Vistaar Publications, 1996), p. 137
5 Ibid., p. 260
6 Ibid., p. 260
7 The Economist, March 8th, 1997, p. 48; Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th Edition; Britannica Books of the Year 1989 - 1991
8 The Federalist Papers, No. 6, Project Gutenberg Etext, June 6, 1992
9 Ibid., No. 9
10 Stanley J. Tambiah ,Leveling Crowds: Ethnonationalist Conflicts and Collective Violence in South Asia, p. 262
11 Republic, Plato: The Collected Dialogues, trans. Paul Shorey, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 496c-e
12 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Richard Crawley, rev. R. Feetham, (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1952), II-65
13 S.E.Finer, The History of Government from the Earliest Times, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 46-47
14 The Economist, January 4th, 1997, p. 28
15 The Economist, May 22nd, 1999, p. 57
16 The Economist, May 31st , 1997, p. 47
17 The Economist, February 16th 2002, page 48
18 The Economist, July 25th 1998, p. 45
19 The Economist, March 8th, 1997, p. 52
20 Himal(Kathmandu, Nepal), May 2000, p. 7
21 The Economist, February 5th 2005, p. 25
22 The Economist, September 11th, 1999, p. 74
23 The Economist, October 2nd, 1999, p. 45
24 The Economist, November 30th 2002, p. 42
25 Newsweek, Special Edition, July-September 2000, p. 50
26 The Economist, "Survey of Israel", April 25th 1998, pp. 13-14
27 Norman Davies, Europe - A History, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 1132, 980-1
28 The Economist, April 9th 1994, p. 49
29 David Reynolds, One World Divisible: A Global History Since 1945, (New York: W.W.Norton and Co., 2000), pp. 606-607
30 The Economist, July 6th 2002, p. 43
31 Scott Christianson, With Liberty for Some: 500 Years of Imprisonment in America, (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1998), p. 281
32 AP report in The Bangladesh Observer, May 16, 2002
33 The Economist, May 4th 2002, p. 39
34 The Economist, April 16th, 1994, pp. 32-34
35 Table compiled from The Economist, August 10th 2002, p. 27
36 Larry Siedentop, Democracy in Europe (London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 2000), p. 122
37 The Economist, February 26th 2000, p. 66
38 The Economist, October 5th 2002, p. 52
39 The Economist, February 24th 2001, p. 55
40 The Economist, June 19th 2004, p. 14
41 J. M. Roberts, Twentieth Century: The History of the World: 1901 To The Present (London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1999), pp. 244-5
42 S.E.Finer, The History of Government from the Earliest Times, p 1638
43 Ibid., p 1548
44 Richard Vinen, A History in Fragments: Europe in the Twentieth Century, (Cambridge, Ma: Da Capo Press, 2001), pp 32 33
45 S.E.Finer, The History of Government from the Earliest Times, p. 1547
46 Ibid., p. 1544
47 Ibid., p. 1534
48 quoted in S.E.Finer, The History of Government from the Earliest Times, p. 1549
49 International Relations, Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th Edition
50 S.E.Finer, The History of Government from the Earliest Times, p. 1549
51 Ibid., p. 1549
52 Ibid., p. 1552-3
53 Bertrand Russell,'Ideas That Have Harmed Mankind', Unpopular Essays (Bombay: Blackie & Son (India) Ltd, 1979), p. 149
54 Hugh Brogan, "Forms of Government", Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th Edition
