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four factors was dispositive, such that a primarily commercial venture such as that in Campbell would look to the other factors in analyzing the alleged infringement. The more important question under the first factor, and in fair use analysis generally, is whether the allegedly infringing work "merely supersedes" the original work "or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning or message," Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579, in other words "whether and to what extent the new work is 'transformative.'" Id., at 579 (quoting Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv.L.Rev. 1105, 1111 (1990)). If "the secondary use adds value to the original-if [copyrightable expression in the original work] is used as raw material, transformed in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings this is the very type of activity that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society." Id. The goal of copyright "is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works." Id., at 579. The inquiry should focus on whether the copying work "merely 'supersedes the objects' of the original . . ., or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message," id. at 579 (quoting Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348) (citations omitted; brackets in original). The Court considered this standard appropriately captured by Judge Leval's helpful adjective "transformative." Id. (quoting Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1111 (1990)).       In focusing the first factor inquiry upon the "transformative" nature of the use, the Court explicitly abandoned the standard in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 78 L. Ed. 2d 574, 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984), that "every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively . . . unfair," id. at 451. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583-85. The Court recalled its statement in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 85 L. Ed. 2d 588, 105 S. Ct. 2218 (1985), that commercial use is only "'a separate factor that tends to weigh against a finding of fair use.'" Campbell, 510 U.S. at 585 (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 585. at 562). The Court noted, however, that "the force of that tendency will vary with the context," id., and that the use of a copyrighted work to advertise a product is a context entitling the copying work to "less indulgence" than if it is marketed for its own worth, see. Id.       The Court's de-emphasis of the first factor's commercial aspect as well as of the fourth factor,

effect on the potential market for, or value of, the original, in favor of an aggregate weighing of all four fair use factors, represented a significant modification of the Court's earlier view, particularly that the fourth factor was "the single most important element of fair use." Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566. See American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 926 (2d Cir. 1995). Rather than accord the fourth factor primacy, the Court stated that "the importance of this factor will vary, not only with the amount of harm, but also with the relative strength of the showing on the other factors." Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 n.21 V. Campbell's Clarification of the Fair Use Defense for Parodies       The Court noted that "parody may or may not be fair use," Id. at 581, and "like any other use, has to work its way through the relevant factors, and be judged case by case, in light of the ends of the copyright law" Id. Specifically relating its first-factor analysis to parodies, the Court stated, "The heart of any parodist's claim to quote from existing material[ ] is the use of some elements of a prior author's composition to create a new one that, at least in part, comments on that author's works." Id. at 580. The comment must have some "critical bearing on the substance or style of the original composition." Id. The Court cautioned that the quality of the parody is not to be evaluated. See id. at 582. The relevant inquiry is "whether a parodic character may reasonably be perceived." Id. A permissible aspect of the inquiry, the Court noted, is "whether the parodic element is slight or great, and the copying small or extensive in relation to the parodic element, for a work with slight parodic element and extensive copying will be more likely to merely 'supersede the objects' of the original." Id. at 582 n.16. Campbell deemed an adequately parodic element present in 2 Live Crew's parody of the song "Oh, Pretty Woman" because the contrast between the copying work and the original "can be taken as a comment on the naivete of the original of an earlier day, as a rejection of its sentiment that ignores the ugliness of street life and the debasement that it signifies." Id. at 583.       With respect to the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, the Court observed that the fact that the original is a creative work "within the core of the copyright's protective purposes . . . is not much help in this case, or ever likely to help much in separating the fair use sheep from the infringing goats in a parody case, since parodies almost invariably copy publicly known, expressive works." Id. at 586.

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